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CONTINUING TO PUT THE BRAKES ON
MEXICAN TRUCKERS: WILL THE U.S.
EVER IMPLEMENT NAFTA ANNEX I?
Dana T. Blackmore*
I. INTRODUCTION
HE North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been
referred to as "the most comprehensive trade agreement ever ne-
gotiated."' With the passage of NAFTA, the United States and
Mexico looked toward liberalization of restrictions pertaining to cross-
border services and anticipated the allowance of cross-border trucking,
which would give commercial vehicles the freedom to travel the entire
"treaty region" by the end of the year 2000.2 Mexico and the United
States have wrestled with the task of complying with NAFTA obligations
regarding cross-border trucking over the past several years.3 This dispute
stems from the refusal of the United States to allow the Mexican trucking
services industry authority to operate fully within U.S. borders, notwith-
standing NAIFTA's mandate that such authorization shall be permitted. 4
"The United States has refused to permit cross-border trucking, citing the
allegedly unsafe nature of Mexican trucks and drivers."' 5 In May 2002,
the unlikely collaboration of various environmentalist groups with the
Teamsters and other truckers and union groups brought the wheels of
Mexican eighteen-wheelers to a screeching halt with the help of the
United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' January 16, 2003, decision
in Public Citizen v. Department of Transportation.6 This is probably not
*The author is an attorney in private practice specializing in insurance defense in
the area of the Employee Retirement Insurance Security Act (ERISA) and the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Ms. Blackmore is a graduate of Thurgood Mar-
shall School of Law at Texas Southern University in Houston.
1. Stephen T. Weisweaver, International Trade: Partners, Politics, and Promises: An
Analysis of the North American Free Trade Agreement's Arbitral Panel Decision
Concerning the United States-Mexico Trucking Dispute, 32 N.M. L. REV. 489
(2002).
2. Hale E. Sheppard, The NAFTA Trucking Dispute: Pretexts for Noncompliance and
Policy Justifications for U.S. Facilitation of Cross-Border Services, II MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 235, 235 (2002).
3. Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 471.
4. Id.
5. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 235.
6. Press Release, Teamsters, Environmentalists' Lawsuit Keeps Border Closed - Cit-
ing Safety Concerns, Ninth Circuit Court Stops Department of Transportation
from Opening U.S.-Mexico Border (Jan. 16, 2003) (stating that on May 1,2002, the
union joined a broad-based coalition of environmental, labor, and consumer
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the last word on the issue of Mexico-U.S. cross-border trucking, 7 which
began over a decade ago with the institution of Annex 1 of NAFTA.8
Although it provides for the entry of Mexican trucks into U.S. border
states starting in December 1995 and into all U.S. states by January 2000,9
Mexican truckers have yet to realize the benefits of NAFIA Annex 1.
This article will provide an analysis of events leading up to the Ninth
Circuit decision, including an analysis of NAFTA Annex 1. This article
will further summarize and provide an analysis of the February 6, 2001
NAFTA Arbitral Panel decision, In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking
Services, and identify American groups who oppose NAFTA Annex 1,
comparing their arguments to the arguments for NAFTA by frustrated
Mexican trucking groups. This article will also show how U.S. compli-
ance with NAFFA Annex 1 and the arbitral panel decision has been frus-
trated by the combination of the U.S. President's role, the U.S.
Department of Transportation's (DOT) role and the role of the U.S. Con-
gress. Additionally, this article will provide an analysis of the January 16,
2003 Ninth Circuit opinion. Finally, this article will provide a discussion
of the impact of the Ninth Circuit decision on future implementation of
NAFTA Annex 1 and predictions regarding the viability of the U.S. bor-
der opening to Mexican trucks and buses.
II. HISTORICAL BACKDROP
The process that ended in the signing of NAFTA began in 1982 with
talks and discussions between the U.S. Council of the Mexico-U.S. Busi-
ness Committee1 ° and its Mexican counterpart on the issue of liberalizing
groups in a lawsuit to stop the Bush administration from opening the border to
Mexican truck traffic), available at http://www.teamster.org/03news/
nr_030116_4.htm. See also Sheppard, supra note 2, at 236 (stating that several op-
position groups insist that the moratorium on cross-border trucking must continue.
These groups believe complete exclusion of Mexican vehicles is the only method
available to guarantee U.S. highway safety, and have used fierce admonitions and
apocalyptic predictions regarding road safety and have effectively managed to con-
vert the NAFTA debate of the early 1990s into the NAFTA implementation de-
bate of the year 2000).
7. Karen Brooks, Politics Stalls Mexican Trucks - Years After NAFTA, U.S. Still Lim-
its Them, DETROrr FREE PRESS, Jan. 15, 2003 (noting that independent experts say
that such delay tactics are wearing thin, and like it or not, the borders are destined
to be open to Mexican trucks), available at http://www.freep.com/money/business/
nafta15_20030115.htm.
8. Id. (noting that NAFTA was signed at the end of 1992 with the goal of streamlining
trade between Mexico, Canada, and the United States).
9. NAFTA Panel Rules in Favor of Mexico in Land Transportation Dispute, NAFTA
WORKS, Feb. 2001, at I (noting that NAFTA Annex 1 provides: (1) On December
18, 1985, Mexican and U.S. trucking companies would have full access to and from
each country's border states; (2) On January 1, 1997, Mexican companies would be
permitted to provide cross-border scheduled bus services; and (3) on January 1,
2000, Mexican and U.S. truckers would have full access to each other's countries).
See also Brooks, supra note 7.
10. Arcie lzquierdo Jordan, Progress By Mexico in Selected Areas Under the North
American Free Trade Agreement, 6 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 331, n.1 (1999) (noting
that the Mexico-U.S. Business Committee is a private sector organization focusing
on public policy issues of interest to the business communities of the two countries.
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trade and investment between the two countries.1 Also in 1982, "Con-
gress enacted the Bus Regulatory Reform Act, which included a two-year
moratorium on the issuance of new U.S. highway authorizations to trucks
domiciled in a foreign country or those owned or controlled by foreign
persons."' 12 The act was passed, in part, due to the refusal of the Mexican
domestic market to allow access to U.S. trucking operators.' 3 The mora-
torium applied to Mexico and Canada, but was lifted for Canada "pursu-
ant to a presidential memorandum indicating that Canadian safety
standards were equal or superior to those existing in the United States. 14
Since 1982, trucks from Mexico have been allowed only in twenty-mile
commercial border zones of the United States, where the trucks then
have to transfer their cargo to U.S. truckers, who then make deliveries
within the United States.15 Conversely, since 1982 Canadian trucks have
been in operation on U.S. highways.' 6
A. THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION: PRE-NAFTA
NEGOTIATIONS TO EXECUTION OF NAFTA
The United States, Mexico, and Canada began negotiations to create
NAFTA in 1990.17 Presidents George H.W. Bush and Carlos Salinas en-
visioned NAFTA as the best means for bringing about a vigorous eco-
nomic relationship and maintaining growth and expansion of trade and
investments between the two countries. 18
The committee has two counterparts: (1) the Mexican counterpart - Consejo Em-
presarial Mexicano para Asuntos Internacionales (CEMAI); and (2) the U.S.
counterpart - the United States Council, which is sponsored by the Council of the
Americas, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the American Chamber in Mexico
City).
11. Id. at 331.
12. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 236-37.
13. Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 473.
14. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 237.
15. Id. at 237 (pointing out that despite the longstanding restriction on Mexico, certain
exceptions were made to facilitate cross-border trade, including the ability of Mex-
ican trucks to operate within designated commercial zones in the four border
states of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas). See also U.S. Court Orders
Study of Mexican Trucks, AUSTIN AMERICAN STATESMAN, Jan. 16, 2003, available
at http://www.austin360.com/aas/news/ap/ap-Lstory.html/National/AP.V9034. See
also Teamsters Online, Background: Impact of NAFTA Trucking Provisions, Jan.
19, 2003, available at http://www.teamster.org/nafta/Olnaftabaground.htm (noting
that Mexican trucks are currently permitted to operate only in a narrow 'commer-
cial zone' in each border state) [hereinafter Teamsters].
16. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 237.
17. Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 472. See also Sheppard, supra note 2, at 237; Jordan,
supra note 10, at 331 (stating that on June 10, 1990, Presidents Bush and Salinas
agreed to begin comprehensive talks that would lead to the negotiation of a U.S.-
Mexico Free Trade Agreement).
18. Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 472. See also Jordan, supra note 10, at 331 (noting
that Presidents Bush and Salinas looked forward to a free trade agreement be-
tween the United States and Mexico that would lead to a process of gradual and
comprehensive elimination of trade barriers between the United States and Mex-
ico, including the full phased elimination of import tariffs; the elimination or fullest
possible reduction of non-tariff trade barriers, such as import quotas, licenses, and
technical barriers to trade; the establishment of clear, binding protection for intel-
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In August 1992, NAFTA was signed with the goal of streamlining trade
between Mexico, Canada, and the United States by removing barriers
such as tariffs and gradually liberalizing cross-border trucking throughout
the continent.' 9 The agreement was entered into and executed by Presi-
dent Bush, President Salinas, and Prime Minister Mulroney.20 In addi-
tion to NAFTA's general goal of removing tariff barriers, pursuant to
NAFTA Annex 1, Mexican trucks were to have free access by December
18, 1995 to U.S. border states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and
Texas), and beginning in January 1, 2000, Mexican trucks were to be al-
lowed to drive throughout the country.2' When the agreement was com-
pleted and signed William J. Clinton was newly elected as President of
the United States and had not yet taken office; however, Mr. Clinton af-
firmed his support of NAFTA.22
B. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION - EXECUTION OF U.S. NAFTA
IMPLEMENTATION ACT THROUGH CONTINUANCE
OF MORATORIUM
In November 1993, Congress passed the NAFTA Implementation
Act.23 The NAFTA Annex I reservations negotiated by the United
States, which include the moratorium on Mexican cross-border trucking
services, expired on December 17, 1995.24 (These reservations will be
discussed further infra). Notwithstanding the enactment of the NAFTA
Implementation Act, "in 1995, under pressure from the Teamsters and
labor unions worried about competition for jobs and unequal safety stan-
dards, President Bill Clinton imposed a moratorium on Mexican
trucks. ' '25 The Clinton administration's ban was a derivative of the Bus
Regulatory Reform Act of 1982,26 which, as stated above, was initially
passed partially in response to Mexico's refusal to allow U.S. truckers to
enter its borders.27 "Section 6(g) of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act im-
lectual property rights; fair and expeditious dispute settlement procedures; and
other means to improve and expand the flow of goods, services, and investment
between the United States and Mexico).
19. Brooks, supra note 7.
20. Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 472.
21. Id. See also Sheppard, supra note 2, at 237.
22. Weisweaver, supra note I, at 472.
23. NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION ACr §§ 3301-
3473 (1993), Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057. 139 CONcG. Risc. D1323-01 (Nov.
17, 1993); 139 CONG. REC. S16, 712-01 (Nov. 20, 1993).
24. See In re Cross-Border Trucking Services (Mex. v. U.S.), USA-MEX-98-2008-01
NAFTA Arbitral Panel, Feb. 6, 2001, available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/
app/DocRepository/lfDispute/english/NaftaChapter_20/USA/u69801e.pdf.
25. Id. See also Teamsters, supra note 15 (stating that "[iln December 1995, the Clin-
ton Administration announced that it would postpone implementing the North
American Free Trade Agreement's (NAFTA) cross-border trucking provisions,
which would have allowed Mexican trucks to travel anywhere in the four U.S.
border states (CA, TX, AZ, NM) effective January 1, 1996, and then anywhere in
the United States by the year 2000").
26. Bus REGULATORY REFORM ACr OF 1982 § 6, 49 U.S.C. § 10922(m) (1994); Pub.
L. No. 97-261; 96 Stat. 1102 (1982).
27. Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 473.
BRAKES ON MEXICAN TRUCKERS
posed a two-year moratorium suspending the issuance of new grants of
operating authority to motor carriers domiciled in, owned, or controlled
by persons of Mexico or Canada. '28 Section 6(g) provides the president
the authority to remove or modify the moratorium.29 As stated above,
the president lifted the moratorium with respect to Canada trucking ser-
vices shortly after implementation of the statute. President Clinton's de-
cision to continue to impose the moratorium on Mexico was based on
reports indicating that Mexican truck and driver safety standards were
lower than standards enforced in the U.S. and the inability of U.S. inspec-
tion and enforcement programs to enforce U.S. standards on Mexican
trucks and drivers.30 Congress then passed the Interstate Commerce
Commission Termination Act of 1995, preserving the moratorium and the
president's authority to modify or remove it.3 1 As such, on December 18,
1995, the U.S. Secretary of the Department of Transportation ("DOT")
stated that the DOT would place a hold on Mexican truckers' documen-
tation, and "final disposition of pending applications would be held until
consultations on safety and security issues were completed. ' 32 In Decem-
ber 1998 the Inspector General of DOT released an audit report titled
Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks at U.S. Borders,
which found that "far too few trucks were being inspected at the U.S.-
Mexico border, and that too few inspected trucks complied with U.S.
standards. ' 33 The audit report concluded that the DOT's enforcement
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Teamsters, supra note 15.
31. Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 473 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 13902(c)(4)(B), Pub. L. No.
104-88 § 103, 109 Stat. 803, 883 (1995)).
32. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 238.
33. Teamsters, supra note 15 (noting the following other findings of the DOT Audit
Report:
The truck out-of-service rate for FY 1997 at border crossings in Texas was
almost 50 percent, compared to the U.S. out-of-service rate of 25 percent.
Preliminary FY 1998 data indicates no improvement for out-of-service rates
at Texas border crossings.
In 1997, 3.5 million commercial trucks entered the U.S., 32.8 percent
(1,162,419) of those at Laredo, TX and 16.8% (596,538) at El Paso, TX. U.S.
inspectors performed 17,332 inspections on those trucks, barely 1 percent;
yet 44 percent of those inspected were removed from service.
At the border crossing in El Paso, TX, where 1300 trucks cross every day,
only one inspector is on duty and he/she can inspect only ten to fourteen
trucks a day. Most inspectors work only during daytime hours, leaving cross-
ings with no inspectors at all during much of the day.
In 1997 at Laredo's two crossing points, 4800 trucks per weekday cross the
border, with 2900 on Saturdays and 2100 on Sundays. Federal Highway Ad-
ministration (FHWA) reports indicate that each inspector (the equivalent of
less than 4 full-time inspectors) averages eight to ten inspectors per day.
FHWA and state inspectors admitted that they do not routinely provide cov-
erage on evenings or weekends, leaving limited coverage on weekdays and
virtually no coverage for the 5,000 trucks crossing at Laredo on weekends.
Texas (67 percent of the truck traffic from Mexico) and Arizona (9 percent)
have no permanent truck inspection facilities at their border crossings. The
U.S. Customs Service allows inspectors to work within the Customs com-
2003]
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program is inconsistent and, thus, does not provide reasonable assurances
that Mexican trucks entering the U.S. are safe. 34 Resistance from the
Clinton administration was also due, in part, to fears that Mexican rigs
would become a "brigade of drug traffickers with immunity to U.S.
law."35
1. Summary of NAFTA ANNEX I - Schedule of the United States,
Sector: Transportation, Sub-Sector: Land Transportation,
Phase-Out: Cross-Border Services and Reservations
" On December 18, 1995, Mexican and U.S. trucking companies
would have full access to and from each country's border states. 36
" On January 1, 1997, Mexican companies would be permitted to
provide cross-border scheduled bus services. 37
" On January 1, 2000, Mexican and U.S. truckers would have full
access to each other's countries.38
2. Mexico's Request For NAFTA Chapter 20 Arbitral Panel
a. Brief Summary Explanation of NAFTA Chapter 20
NAFTA created a "Free Trade Commission, which is responsible for
supervising the implementation of the Agreement and resolving disputes.
Trade ministers of the three NAFTA countries make up the body of the
NAFTA Free Trade Commission.39 Chapter 20 of NAFTA provides dis-
pute resolution regarding the application and interpretation of the Agree-
ment.''40 The Chapter 20 dispute resolution component is divided into
three steps. The first Step provides for consultations between the disput-
ing parties.41 If the consultation stage is not successful, the complaining
party may request conciliation or mediation by the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission.42 The final step provides that the complaining party may
request an arbitral panel.43 The arbitral panel is required to issue an ini-
pound on a "space available" basis. At several major crossings, this allows
enough space for only placing three or four vehicles out-of-service. When
that space is full, inspections stop or out-of-service trucks are sent back to
Mexico. At Brownsville and El Paso, the turn-around point for rejected
trucks is in the United States and out of sight of the inspectors, preventing
them from confirming that the Mexican drivers have indeed returned to
Mexico.
34. Id.
35. Brooks, supra note 7.
36. See supra n. 9.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 471-72 (citing North American Free Trade Agree-
ment, Dec. 17, 1993, Can.-Mex.-U.S., art. 2001 32 1.L.M. 296 and noting that




43. Id. (citing NAFTA art. 2011, which states that "NAFTA Chapter 20 regulates dis-
pute resolution and allows a party to bring forth a complaint against another party.
A panel is composed of five members. Where there are two disputing parties, both
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tial report, findings of fact, a determination of the legal issues, and recom-
mendations for resolution of the disputed issues. 44 The parties are
allowed to file written comments to the initial report within fourteen
days.45 The arbitral process is concluded with the issuance of a final re-
port within thirty days of the initial report. 46
"The Mexican government reacted to the Clinton Administration ac-
tion by first requesting consultations with the United States pursuant to
Chapter 20 of NAFTA, which were held in January of 1996." 47 The con-
sultation process did not lead to resolution of the dispute, and Mexico,
therefore, requested a meeting in July 1998 with the Free Trade Commis-
sion in accordance with Article 2007 of NAFTA. 48 However, the parties
were again unsuccessful in reaching an agreement. 49 Therefore, "the
Government of Mexico requested the formation of an arbitral panel to
hear the dispute pursuant to NAFTA Article 2008(1)."50 While the Arbi-
tral Panel dispute was pending, the United States failed to adhere to the
January 1, 2000 NAFTA deadline, which would have given Mexican
trucks access to all American roadways.51 The justification for this action
was the same offered for noncompliance in 1995 - Mexico's inadequate
vehicle safety regulations and enforcement supported an extension of the
moratorium. 52 In addition, President Clinton stated that the moratorium
would be prolonged due to the difficulty of ensuring Mexican truckers'
compliance with U.S. safety standards. 53 The NAFTA panel conducted
the arbitration in May 2000 and issued a final report in February 2001. 54
The Arbitral Panel issued a unanimous decision against the United
States, which held that the "blanket" refusal by the United States to allow
cross-border entry of Mexican trucks constituted a breach of Annex I of
NAFrA.55 The NAFTA Panel instructed the United States to comply
parties agree to the chair of the panel. Then each party selects two panelists who




47. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 238.
48. Id.; See also NAFTA art. 2007.
49. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 238.
50. SICE - Foreign Trade Information System, North American Free Trade Agree-
ment Arbitral Panel Established Pursuant to Chapter Twenty-In the matter of Cross-
Border Trucking Services (Feb. 6, 2001), at http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/
nafta/english/U98081ae.asp. See also Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 474 (stating that
"[blecause of the disparity in treatment, and the provisions agreed to under
NAFTA, Mexico ultimately requested arbitration in front of an international panel
established under NAFTA guidelines").
51. See Rossella Brevetti, DOT to Continue Current Policy Limiting Mexican Truck
Access, 17 INT'L TRADE REP. 16 (2000), available at http://www.bna.com/products/
corplaw/itr.htm.
52. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 239.
53. Clinton Promises Teamsters to Keep Border Closed, 19 WASH. TARIF & TRADE
LEl-rER 1 (1999).
54. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 239.
55. See Office of the United States Trade Representative, Arbitral Panel established
pursuant to Chapter Twenty in the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services J 295
2003]
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with its obligations under NAFTA regarding cross-border trucking
services. 56
b. U.S. Argument
The United States asserted that because of differences in U.S. and
Mexican regulatory systems, the Mexican trucking industry did not con-
form to "like circumstances" in the U.S. trucking industry.5 7 Further, the
United States argued that the "Mexican safety regime lacks essential
components, such as comprehensive truck equipment standards, fully
functioning roadside inspections and onsite compliance reviews, strict re-
cord-keeping rules, and a substantial commitment of enforcement re-
courses and personnel. '58 As such, the United States contended that its
decision to continue the moratorium was "prudent and consistent with its
obligations under NAFTA and was not in violation of the articles of
NAFTA concerning national and most favored nation treatment because
similar treatment was not an obligation under NAFTA. '59 The United
States said it could not ensure safety of Mexican trucks on a case-by-case
basis because it could not practically inspect every truck crossing the
U.S.-Mexico border. 60 As such, the United States argued that highway
safety could only be ensured by a comprehensive and integrated regime
within Mexico. 61
c. Mexico's Argument
In requesting the chapter 20 arbitration, Mexico alleged that the
United States had agreed to phase out its moratorium on cross-border
trucking services. 62 Mexico therefore contended that the United States'
failure to comply with NAFTA constituted a violation of two NAFTA
provisions. 63
The first provision requires each NAFTA party to extend national
treatment and most-favored nation treatment to each party nation's ser-
vice providers and investors.64 Mexico asserted the refusal by the United
States to process Mexican truckers' applications is a denial of national
treatment because the operating authority for U.S. trucks is considered
on a case-by-case basis.65
The second provision requires each party nation to eliminate reserva-
tions from the national treatment and most-favored nation treatment ob-
(Feb. 6, 2001), available at http://www.ustr.gov/enforcement/trucking.pdf [hereinaf-
ter NAFTA Trucking Panel Report].
56. Id. 9 299
57. Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 475.
58. NAIFTA Trucking Panel Report, supra note 55, at 1 153-60.
59. Id. 9 154
60. Id. 9 155
61. Id.
62. Id. 9 102.
63. Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 475.
64. Id. (citing NAFTA Trucking Panel Report, supra note 55, at 91 102).
65. NAFTA Trucking Panel Report, supra note 55, at 9 117.
BRAKES ON MEXICAN TRUCKERS
ligation regarding trucking services as set forth in the schedules set out in
the reservations.66 In addition, Mexico contended it was being denied
most favored nation treatment because the United States processes Cana-
dian motor carriers with none of the restrictions imposed on Mexican
carriers. 67
In response to the U.S. argument regarding the differences in each
party's trucking services safety standards, Mexico asserted that there is no
provision in NAFTA that allows a party to impose its nations' laws on
other party nations. ' 68 Mexico contended that the United States commit-
ted to NAFTA when both the Mexican and U.S. governments were fully
aware that their respective trucking safety standards were not identical. 69
Mexico therefore argued that the lack of trucking safety standards com-
parable to those of the United States is not a valid reason for the United
States' refusal to allow entry of Mexico's trucks. 70
d. Analysis of Panel Decision - In Addition to National Treatment
and Most Favored Nation Issues, Did Any Reservations
or Exceptions to NAFTA Annex I Exist to Justify
U.S. Action?
The NAFTA Panel sought to determine whether the U.S. Moratorium
rendered it in breach of NAFTA Articles 1202 and 1203. 7 1 The Panel
also sought to determine if any reservations or exceptions to the Agree-
ment excepted the United States' actions from the purview of the
Agreement" 72
Article 1202 entitled "National Treatment" requires a Party to extend
to service providers of another Party treatment no less favorable than it
extends in the same or similar circumstances to its own service provid-
ers.73 Article 1203 entitled "Most-Favored Nation Treatment" requires
each Party to extend treatment no less favorable to service providers of
66. Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 475 (citing NAFTA Trucking Panel Report, supra
note 55, at $ 102).
67. NAFTA Trucking Panel Report, supra note 55, at 9 119.
68. Id. 1 109.
69. Id. 1 111.
70. Id. 1 113.
71. Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 474 & 481 (citing NAFFA Trucking Panel Report at
$1 and 'l 241, stating that the principal issue surrounding the dispute concerning
services was based largely on the parties' interpretation of NAFFA article 1202
(national treatment for cross-border services) and 1203 (most-favored nation treat-
ment for cross border services)).
72. Id. at 474 (citing NAFTA Trucking Panel Report, supra note 55 at $ 100). See also
Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 481 (stating the panel established that the mainte-
nance of the moratorium needed to be justified under the language of article 1202,
1203, or some other NAFTA provision such as chapter nine's standard related
measures for article 2101 on general exceptions, and noting that NAFFA allows a
party to apply measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
.not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to
health and safety and consumer protection').
73. C. O'Neal Taylor, Two Regional Issues: The Mexican Trucking Case and NAFTA:
Introduction, Commentary, and Afterword & The Future of International Economic
Dispute Resolution in the Western Hemisphere (Dispute Settlement in the FTAA)
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another Party than it extends, in the same or similar circumstances, to
service providers of any other Party or non-party.74 The panel looked to
the historical definition of "in like circumstances" language for most-fa-
vored-nation treatment as interpreted in the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement (CFTA) 75 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). 76 The panel determined that the CFTA and GATT nar-
rowly interpreted the language "in like circumstances" and that a broad
interpretation could render articles 1202 and 1203 meaningless, essen-
tially defeating the overall objective of NAFTA. 77 The panel believed it
would be unreasonable to require the regulatory systems of two NAFTA
countries to be substantially identical before national treatment is
granted because relatively few service industry providers could ultimately
qualify. 78 As such, the panel concluded that the United States' under-
standing of "in like circumstances" was too broad and did not justify con-
tinuation of the moratorium, rendering the United States in breach of its
NAFTA obligations. 79 The panel also concluded that the United States'
continuation of the moratorium was not justified under any exceptions
provided in NAFTA article 2101.80 The panel found the moratorium to
be an arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination and/or a disguised restric-
tion on trade and determined that the United States failed to demon-
strate that there were no alternative means of achieving its safety
objectives that are more consistent with NAFTA. 81
e. Holding of Arbitral Panel
The panel held that the blanket refusal by the United States to review
and consider the approval of any Mexican-owned truck carrier applica-
tions for authority to provide cross-border trucking services is a breach of
U.S. obligations under NAFTA.82 The panel further held that the differ-
ences of the Mexican regulatory system from that of the United States
did not provide sufficient legal justification for the United States to main-
tain a moratorium regarding Mexican trucks.83 "The Panel 'recom-
mended' that the United States take appropriate steps to bring its
practices into compliance with NAFTA." 84 The panel determined that to
be in compliance with Annex I, the United States did not have to give
favorable consideration to all or any specific number of applications from
the Mexican Trucking Case and NAFTA: Introduction, Commentary and
Afterword: Introduction, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 1239, 1241 n.25 (2001).
74. Id. at n.26.
75. See 27 I.L.M. 293 (indicating that much of NAFTA was modeled after the CFTA,
which entered into force on Jan. 1, 1989).
76. NAFTA Trucking Panel Report, supra note 55, at 919 250-51.
77. Id. 9 1 259-60.
78. Id. 1 259.
79. Id. 11 259 & 278.
80. Id. 1 278.
81. Id. 1 269.
82. Id. 1 295.
83. Id. 1 296.
84. Id. 9 299.
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a particular Mexican trucking firm if it is evident that the applicant may
be unable to comply with U.S. trucking regulations when operating in the
United States. 85 The panel determined that the United States - not Mex-
ico - is responsible for the safe operation of trucks on U.S. roadways,
whether the trucks are American, Canadian, or Mexican.86 Further, the
panel found that the United States is not required to treat applications
from Mexican trucking firms in exactly the same manner as applications
from the United States or Canada as long as each application is reviewed
on a case-by-case basis.8 7
However, if the United States decided to impose different require-
ments for Mexican trucks than those imposed for U.S. and Canadian
trucks, the requirements must abide by the following guidelines: (1) the
requirements must be made in good faith with respect to legitimate safety
concerns; and (2) the United States must implement requirements that
fully conform to all of the NAFTA provisions. 8
The panel found that rather than barring all Mexican applicants, the
United States should examine Mexican trucking firms on a case-by-case
basis to determine whether they meet U.S. safety standards.8 9
C. THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION
On February 6, 2001, a few months after George W. Bush became pres-
ident, the "NAFTA arbitration panel decided that the Clinton morato-
rium violated NAFTA and that the U.S. should expedite efforts to open
the borders." 90 This ruling prompted Congress in August 2001 to pass
stiff safety restrictions on Mexican trucks.91 The United States did not
comply with NAFTA Annex I within the thirty-day period deadline, nev-
ertheless, President George W. Bush promised that he would do his best
to bring the United States into compliance no later than January 1,
2002.92 The Bush Administration stated that "a one-year waiting period
would (1) allow Congress time to appropriate the necessary funds in the
2001-2002 budget to implement the new measures and (2) grant the DOT
sufficient opportunity to enact regulations aimed at ensuring safety com-
pliance."'93 The Mexican government took these statements as "a gesture





89. Id. 9] 300.
90. Brooks, supra note 7.
91. Id. See also Teamsters, supra note 15 (stating that "the U.S. House and Senate
took immediate action and passed the FY2002 Department of Transportation Ap-
propriations bill, which required that numerous safety measures be implemented
before any Mexican trucks would be permitted to travel beyond the commercial
zone").
92. David Hendricks, Mexican Trucks Can Roll; White House Clears Road for Deliv-
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the United States as long as conciliatory efforts continued. '94
The Bush administration made it a goal to lift the ban and comply with
NAFTA's requirements. 95 After the events of September 11, 2001, U.S.
border security became even more important prompting further support
for keeping Mexican trucks out of the United States. 96 Although the
events of September 11, 2001 stalled Bush's efforts, a deadline of May 3,
2002 was set to implement the opening of the border.97 However, the
May deadline was not met due to an unfinished inspector general's report
on truck safety. 98 As such, a new deadline was set for July 2002, which
has also come and gone.
1. U.S. Department of Transportation 2002 Appropriations Bill
Containing Provisions Consistent with Arbitral Panel
Decision
The DOT introduced Trucking Regulations in accordance with the
Bush Administration's May 2001 Conciliatory Announcement.9 9 The
DOT Trucking Regulations are comprised of three separate parts.10 0 The
first Regulation provides procedures implemented to ensure compliance
by Mexican truckers in an effort to certification to operate in the four
border states - California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. 0 1 The sec-
ond DOT Regulation provides rules to guide the issuance of permits to
operate beyond the four border states.1 02 The third DOT Regulation,
establishes a "supplementary oversight program," which would allow
government officials to conduct roadside inspections and on-site compli-
ance inspections at the headquarters of Mexican trucking companies. 10 3
94. See U.S. Misses Deadline for Mexican Truck Access; Safety Concerns Postpone Pol-
icy Required by NAFTA, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Mar. 8, 2001, at A13.
95. See Press Release, Determination Under the Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act of 1995, (June 6, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/06/20010606.1.html. See also Press Release, Joint Statement by
President George Bush and President Vincente Fox Towards a Partnership for
Prosperity: The Guanajuato Proposal, (Feb. 16, 2001) available at http:www.white
house.gov/new/releases/2001102/20010220-2.html.
96. Bus and Truck Security and Hazardous Materials Licensing: Hearing Before the S.
Subcomm. the on Surface Transportation And Merchant Marines, 107th Cong. 38,
54 (2001) available at http://www.citizen.org/autosafetvrruck Safety/articles.cfm.?
ID=6261(testimony of Joan Claybrook, President, Public Citizen stating that na-
tional security concerns in light of the terrorist attacks on the United States on
Sept. 11, 2001, is additional authority to support not complying with Annex I)
[hereinafter Bus and Truck Security].
97. Brooks, supra note 7.
98. Id.
99. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 235.
100. 49 C.F.R. pt. 365 (2001).
101. See Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, 66 Fed. Reg. 86,22328 (May 3,
2001) (codified as 49 C.F.R. pts. 368 & 387).
102. Id. at 86,22330.
103. Id. at 86,22371.
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2. Congressional Approval of the Sabo Amendment Precluded the
Expenditure of U.S. Government Funds to Process
Applications Pursuant to U.S. DOT 2002
Appropriations Bill by Mexican Truckers
Congress immediately opposed the DOT trucking regulations were im-
mediately opposed by Congress. 10 4 One month after publication of the
proposed regulations, the U.S. House of Representatives approved the
Sabo Amendment, which dealt a blow to the Bush administration's free
trade intentions. 10 5 The House approved the Sabo Amendment with
overwhelming force and effectively precluded the expenditure of U.S.
government funds to process applications submitted by Mexican truck-
ers.'0 6 Although this legislation was questionable in light of the NAFTA
Arbitral Panel decision, many members of the House Seemed uncon-
cerned with the validity of the legislation and sought to uphold U.S.
safety standards at all costs. 10 7 A majority of the House members ex-
claimed that "NAFTA is a trade agreement - not a suicide pact.'
' 0 8
3. U.S. Coalition Files Suit for Injunction With U.S. Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals
With the news of George W. Bush's intention to finalize the lifting of
the moratorium by May 2002, on May 1, 2002 a "coalition" of environ-
mentalists and labor groups, including Public Citizen, the Environmental
Law Foundation, California Federation of Labor, California Trucking As-
sociation, and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, filed a lawsuit
Seeking an emergency injunction to prevent the Bush administration's
May 3, 2002 action.' 0 9 Between July 2002 and August 2002, the parties to
the Ninth Circuit lawsuit filed briefs and submitted oral arguments and
on January 16, 2003 the court rendered a decision that found the Bush
104. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 242.
105. Heather Rothman & Rossella Brevetti, House Bars Funds for Processing of Mexi-
can Truck Applications in U.S., 18 INTL TRADE REP. 1002 (2001) available at http:/
/www.bna.com/products/corplaw/itr.htm.
106. Comments on Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2002, DAILY DIGEST at H3586-H3594 (June 26, 2001) (noting the distraught
feelings regarding the fact that the DOT trucking regulations would allow Mexican
trucks to operate in the United States for up to eighteen months without first satis-
fying U.S. safety standards, Rep. Martin Sabo initially introduced a less stringent
amendment that simply precluded funding for the DOT regulations, unless safety
requirements were satisfied before granting Mexican trucks a certificate of regis-
tration), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/r107/rl07d26jnl.html [hereinafter
Comments].
107. See Sheppard, supra note 2, at 242-43.
108. Comments, supra note 106, at H3587.
109. Id. (stating that environmental, labor, and trucking groups - which had stymied
efforts to open the borders for nearly a decade by arguing about safety issues -
asked for an injunction based on environmental concerns);Press Release, Team-
sters, Teamsters, Environmentalists' Lawsuit Keeps Border Closed - Citing Safety
Concerns, Ninth Circuit Court Stops Department of Transportation from Opening
U.S.-Mexico Border (Jan. 16, 2003) at http://www.teamsters.org/03news/
nr_030116_4.htm.
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administration action was in violation of the National Environmental Pol-
icy Act (NEPA) and the Clean Air Act (CAA)." 0 "The three-judge
panel said the department acted 'arbitrarily and capriciously' by not pre-
paring a full statement on air quality as required by NEPA and the
CAA."1 1 1 This decision "required the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion to prepare a full environmental Impact Statement and Clean Air Act
conformity determination before it can open the U.S. Mexican
border." l2
III. ANALYSIS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION
A. IDENTIFICATION OF U.S. COALITION PARTIES AGAINST NAFTA
ANNEX I - THE PETITIONERS
California Labor Organizations replaced the AFL-CIO. Labor organi-
zations like the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Or-
ganizations (AFL-CIO) have vehemently pressured the Bush
administration to disregard the mandate from the NAFTA panel notwith-
standing the economic consequences by questioning the functionality of
the DOT Regulations that respond to the NAFTA Panel decision.1 13 The
AFL-CIO has warned on several occasions that "because the hourly rate
of Mexican driver is lower than that in the United States, 'American
trucking companies will simply close their U.S. factories and move their
headquarters across the border.'" 14
Based on the foregoing, it is quite strange that the AFL-CIO was not
among the petitioners in the Ninth Circuit case. This decision was likely
part of a successful forum shopping attempt strategically lodged by the
petitioners. The AFL-CIO was replaced with the Auto and Truck Drivers
Local 70, California Labor Federation, and the California Trucking Asso-
ciation, a guarantee to ensure placement of this matter in the Ninth Cir-
cuit - a circuit known for its radical decisions.
The Environmentalists may have been used as pawns to make the argu-
ment more credible and deal with any problems associated with standing.
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Brotherhood of
Teamsters (Teamsters), one of the largest organized labor groups, is on
the front lines of the war against allowing the entry of Mexican trucks
into the United States. The Teamsters' main fear is the "the potential
negative repercussions of eliminating thousands of U.S. jobs, endangering
110. Id. (stating that the "Ninth Circuit required the U.S. Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT) to prepare a full Environmental Impact Statement and Clean Air Act
conformity determination before it can open the U.S. Mexican border").
111. U.S. Court Orders Study of Mexican Trucks, AUSTIN AMERICAN STATESMAN, Jan.
16, 2003), available at http://www.austin360.com/aas.news/ap/ap-story.html/Na-
tional/AP.V9034. See also Teamsters, supra note 15.
112. Environmentalists, supra note 109.
113. Transportation Labor Endorses House Resolution to Keep Unsafe Mexican Trucks
and Buses Off U.S. Highways, U.S. NEWSWIRE, 2001 WL 21894138 (May 24, 2001).
114. Teamsters Asks DOT About Change in Highway Access for Mexican Trucks, 16
INT'L TRADE REP. 1537 (1999), at http://www.bna.com/products/corplaw/itr.htm.
BRAKES ON MEXICAN TRUCKERS
American drivers, drug smuggling and imperiling the environment."'1 5 It
is frequently argued that the Teamsters' true motive is job protection-
ism.' 16 They assert that they will suffer "both from extra competition and
from a possible increase in the number of truck accidents" - in their view,
Annex I threatens both their pocketbooks and their safety." 17 The Team-
sters are concerned that Mexican truckers "fix things with bubble gum
and tape."'' 8
Public Citizen is also at the forefront of NAFTA trucking opposi-
tion." 9 Public Citizen argues that it is unrealistic to believe the safety of
American motorists will be guaranteed by inspecting each Mexican truck,
because current resources allow for the inspection of only 1 percent of
Mexican trucks at the border.120 In addition, Public Citizen argues that
full NAFTA trucking compliance would be catastrophic for U.S. towns
located on the border because of the lucrative temptations of transport-
ing narcotics, undocumented immigrants, and contraband such as weap-
ons and stolen cars.121 Public Citizen advocates that the United States
should continue to violate its NAFTA obligations by closing its border
until a consensus is reached regarding safety standards and contends that
the United States should opt to pay the noncompliance fine rather than
comply with NAFFA Annex 1.122 To do otherwise, Public Citizen be-
lieves, will cause the public to realize the dangers that "an anti-demo-
cratic and anti-safety decision rendered by a secret international trade
tribunal can bring to the United States' front door."'1 23
B. SIGNIFICANT FACTS
The petitioners, including Teamsters, Auto and Truck Drivers Local 70,
California Labor Federation, California Trucking Association, Environ-
mental Law Foundation, and Public Citizen, and the petitioners in inter-
vention, including the Natural Resources Defense Council and the
Planning and Conservation League (collectively petitioners) filed suit
115. Press Release, Teamsters, Inspector General's Report Confirms U.S. Is Not Ready
to Open Border with Mexico (May 10, 2001) http://www.teamster.org/nafta/01
naftabackground.htm [hereinafter Inspector General]; See also Press Release,
Teamsters, ABC Nightline Reveals DEA Hid Information on Mexican Drug
Smuggling During 1993 NAFTA Debate (May 8, 1997), at http://www.teamster.
org/nafta/lnaftabackground.htm.
116. Sheppard, supra note 2, at 255.
117. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Pena, 17 F.3d 1478, 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
118. Inspector General, supra note 115.
119. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Mexican Truck Inspection Program Sorely Lacking, Allows
Trucks with Faulty Brakes, Leaky Fuel Lines to Stay on Road (Feb. 7, 2001), at
http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=710; Public Citizen, NAFTA
Truck Ruling Imperils U.S. Public Safety, (Nov. 29, 2000), at http://www.citizen.org/
pressroom/release.cfm?ID=490.
120. Public Citizen, The Coming NAFTA Crash: The Deadly Impact of a Secret NAFTA
Tribunal's Decision to Open U.S. Highways to Unsafe Mexican Trucks, (Feb. 1,
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against respondents the U.S. DOT, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Ad-
ministration (FMCSA), Joseph M. Clapp, and Nicholas R. Walsh. 124 The
action was brought before a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit, and
challenged the DOT's failure to conduct environmental analysis prior to
promulgation of the three DOT safety regulations by the FMCSA, which
the Bush administration felt were necessary to bring the United States
into compliance with NAFTA Annex 1.125 Petitioners alleged that the
DOT's failure to prepare an in-depth Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) for all three regulations violates the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 (NEPA) and that the DOT's failure to conduct a "conformity
determination" to ensure that the three safety regulations do not disrupt
applicable state implementation plans violates the Clean Air Act
(CAA). 12 6
The DOT completed a preliminary environmental assessment (EA) for
two of the three regulations (the application and safety rules) and deter-
mined there was no need for a full EIS, because the rules did not "signifi-
cantly affect the quality of the human environment.' 1 2 7 Thus, the DOT
issued a finding of no significant impact. 12 8 The DOT did not prepare a
preliminary EA for the certification rule because it determined that this
regulation fell into the categorical exclusions from the EA/EIS require-
ment in the NEPA regulations. 12 9 Nor did the DOT prepare a CAA con-
formity determination for any of the three safety regulations, because it
determined that certain categorical exceptions to the conformity determi-
nation requirement applied to them.130
All three of the DOT safety regulations were published in the Federal
Register on March 19, 2002.131 Petitioners timely filed petition to chal-
lenge the validity of the application and safety rules on May 2, 2002 (No.
02-70986), which was followed by the timely filed petition challenging the
validity of the certification rule on May 14, 2002 (No. 02-71249).132 Both
petitions alleging violations of the procedural requirements of NEPA and
CAA were brought pursuant to the judicial review provision of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act (APA).133 It should be noted that the peti-
tioners' claim is technically not regarding NAFTA Annex I, which is a
provision of an international agreement but rather regarding the legality
of the three DOT safety regulations that are appurtenant to NAFTA An-
nex I.
124. Public Citizen v. Dept. of Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1009 (9th Cir. 2003).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (2003) (cited in Public Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1013).
128. Public Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1013.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1014.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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C. ISSUES
The court stated that its function was very narrow-to determine
whether the DOT's act of promulgating the three safety regulations vio-
lated NEPA and CAA. The court first considered whether the DOT ac-
ted arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to prepare an EIS pursuant
to NEPA for the application and safety rules on the basis of its EA.
1 34
Next, the court considered whether the DOT acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously in failing to conduct an EA and/or EIS at all pursuant to NEPA
for the certification rule. 135 Finally, the court considered whether the
DOT acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to conduct a conformity
determination pursuant to CAA for any of the three regulations.
136
Quite interestingly, the court admitted at the outset and at the end of
the decision that "[t]he President of the United States is not a party to
this action, and the issues before [the court] do not touch on his clear,
unreviewable discretionary authority to modify the moratorium pursuant
to the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995."137
The court further stated that "neither the validity of nor the United
States' compliance with NAFTA" would be considered by the court. 138
As will be illustrated below, the court's statements in this regard are in-
consistent with its analysis to determine whether the petitioners had




The court first looked at the issue of whether the petitioners had stand-
ing to bring the suit.1 40 The court determined that it "only needed to find
that one Petitioner had standing to allow the case to proceed.' 141 Follow-
ing the recommendation of the petitioners, the court considered the
standing of Public Citizen only.' 4 2 The court followed the basic textbook
standing analysis - injury in fact, causation, and redressability. 143 The
court's redressability analysis is arguably flawed. The court found redres-
sability because "if [the court] granted Public Citizen's petition, no Mex-
ico domiciled trucks would be permitted into the United States beyond
the commercial border zones until DOT conducted the required analy-
sis."''14 4 Moreover, the court stated that "Public Citizen would suffer
harm if [the court] denied its petitions, but the harm would be avoided
134. Id. at 1021.
135. Id. at 1028.
136. Id. at 1029.
137. Id. at 1020.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 1019.
140. Id. at 1014-15.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1015.
143. Id. at 1014-19.
144. Id. at 1019.
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entirely if it granted the petitions."'1 45 This analysis is wholly inconsistent
with the court's declaration at the end of its standing analysis that its
decision would have no effect on the president's clear, unreviewable dis-
cretionary authority to modify the moratorium pursuant to the Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995.146 Regardless of
whether the court granted the petitioner's petitions, the president could
still lift the moratorium pursuant to authority granted to him in this act.
As such, redressability arguably was lacking. At any rate, the court found
that Public Citizen had standing to bring the suit.147
2. Did DOT Act Arbitrarily and Capriciously When it Failed to
Prepare an EIS Pursuant to NEPA for the Application and
Safety Rules on the Basis of its EA?
The court determined that NEPA mandates that all "major federal ac-
tivities significantly effecting the human environment conduct the prepa-
ration of an EIS. 148 In some instances, an agency may prepare an EA in
lieu of preparing an EIS in an effort of making a preliminary determina-
tion of significant environmental effect.' 49 If, however the EA findings
indicate significant environmental effect, an EIS must be prepared.15 0 If
the EA findings indicate that there is no significant environmental effect,
the agency must issue a Finding of No Significant Impact ("FONSI") in
addition to a convincing statement of the reasons why. 15'
As such, to decide whether an EIS was required, the court found that it
must determine: (1) whether the challenged rules constitute major federal
actions; and (2) whether the rules may significantly affect the environ-
ment.152 In its analysis of these questions, the court looked to the Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which was established by
NEPA, 153 154 The court relied on these regulations to guide its review of
an agency's compliance with NEPA, finding that the Supreme Court has
held that agencies are entitled to substantial deference. 155 The court de-
termined that the "relevant CEO regulations implementing NEPA define
'major Federal actions' as 'actions with effects that may be major and
which are potentially subject to Federal control and responsibility' includ-
ing 'adoption of official policy, such as rules, regulations, and interpreta-
tions.' 56 The DOT did not dispute that its actions were federal, but did
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1020.





153. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342-4347 (1970).
154. Public Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1022.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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dispute the petitioners' allegations regarding the regulations' effects. 157
The court then turned to the analysis of whether the action "signifi-
cantly affected the human environment."'' 5 8 The DOT asserted that the
effects of the application and safety rules would result in no increase of
Mexican truck traffic.1 59 Within its analysis of whether the DOT applica-
tion and safety regulations "significantly affected the human environ-
ment," the court looked to the CEQ regulations, which explained that
these considerations must be analyzed by studying the "national, re-
gional, and local contexts as well as by looking at the short- and long-
term effects of the proposed action. '1 60 The court found that the DOT's
EA was inadequate in this regard because the DOT analyzed the possible
emissions only on a national level - "it did not conduct any analysis re-
garding whether increased in emissions could occur on a localized level in
certain areas near the Mexican border, i.e. southern California or
Texas. ' 161 As such, the court found that the DOT's EA regarding the
application and safety rules was inadequate to lead to a FONSI and that
the DOT acted arbitrarily and capriciously in failing to prepare an EIS.162
3. Did DOT Act Arbitrarily and Capriciously in Failing to Conduct an
EA and/or EIS Pursuant to NEPA for the Certification
Rule?
The CEQ regulations provide that actions that do not have a significant
effect on the human environment be excluded. 163 These actions do not
require an EA or an EIS.164 Agencies are required to implement guide-
lines to distinguish which of their actions do or do not require an EA or
EIS. 165 The court found that FMCSA and DOT guidelines did not in-
clude a categorical exclusion that would encompass the certification
rule. 166 The DOT argued that although the certification rule is not sub-
ject to any of the DOT's categorical exclusions, it should be categorically
excluded from the EA/EIS requirement because it has no significant en-
vironmental impact.1 67 The court flatly invalidated this assertion and
found that since the DOT failed to identify any particular categorical ex-
clusion applicable to the certification rule, it acted arbitrarily and capri-




160. Id. at 1023.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1021-22, 1027.




167. Id. at 1029.
168. Id.
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4. Did DOT Act Arbitrarily and Capriciously in Failing to Conduct a
Conformity Determination Pursuant to CAA for Any of the
Three Regulations?
The CAA required the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to
establish air quality standards with regarding the pollutants 169 at issue.17 0
As a result, each state is required to submit a State Implementation Plan
("SIP") for each pollutant to the EPA for approval."' 71 To ensure com-
pliance with these plans, the CAA contains a "Conformity Require-
ment," which provides that activities that do not conform with a SIP shall
not be approved. 172 Most federal actions affecting levels of pollutants in
nonattainment regions require that the responsible agency conduct a con-
formity determination. 173 This requirement exempts the following two
categories of federal action: (1) "actions where the total of direct and
indirect emissions are below the emissions level specified in the regula-
tions; 174 and (2) actions which would result in no emissions increase or an
increase in emissions that is clearly de minimis, including rulemaking and
policy development and issuance. ' 175 The court found that this would
require DOT conduct analysis that would lead to predictions of emissions
levels. 176 Because the court found that the DOT failed to conduct relia-
ble analysis, it had no credible information regarding predictions of emis-
sions levels, and as such, acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to
conduct conformity determinations for any of the three regulations.177
E. HOLDING - U.S. DOT ORDERED TO PREPARE NEPA EIS AND
CAA CONFORMITY DETERMINATION
Based on the foregoing, "the Court held that DOT acted arbitrarily
and capriciously in failing to prepare a Full EIS pursuant to NEPA as well
as a Conformity Determination pursuant to CAA for the Three Regula-
tions."'178 The court granted the petitioners' petitions and remanded the
matter to the DOT so that it might prepare a full EIS and conformity
determination for all three regulations. 179 As stated above, the court
strongly reiterated that its decision "made no determinations about the
actions of the President of the United States (George W. Bush) nor the
validity of NAFrA, neither of which was before it."180
169. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1970).




174. 40 C.F.R. § 93.153(c)(1) (2003).
175. Public Citizen, 316 F.3d at 1029.
176. Id. at 1030.
177. Id. at 1031.
178. Id. at 1032.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION
A. HIERARCHY/CONFLICT OF LAWS
Two principal types of law exist within international law.' 81 The first
type is treaty law, which refers to obligations that emanate from express
agreements among states. 182 The second type of international law, cus-
tomary international law, refers to unwritten obligations that are inferred
from general practices of states. 183 Obviously, NAFTA is a product of
treaty international law.
Article II, section 2, clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution provides the pres-
ident with authority to enter into treaties with the advice and consent of
the Senate. 184 However, no reference is made to executive agreements in
the text of the Constitution. Nevertheless, executive agreements have
long been accepted practice in the United States, and they do not require
advice and consent of the Senate.' 85 Furthermore, article IV of the Con-
stitution (the Supremacy Clause) provides that "treaties, along with fed-
eral statutes, are supreme over any inconsistent state law."' 186 As such,
the rule of hierarchy of laws dictates that if a treaty is self-executing, it
preempts state laws and other law equal to federal statutory law, and be-
low federal constitutional law. 187 In this regard, treaties are generally
thought to be equal in status to federal statutes, and if a conflict arises
between a federal statute and a treaty, the "last-in-time" rule governs. 188
However, the last-in-time rule applies only to self-executing treaties. 189
A treaty and its provisions can be either "self-executing" or "non self-
executing". 190 Distinguishing between "self-executing" and "non self-ex-
ecuting" treaties is a judicially developed doctrine. 19' The Supremacy
Clause has been interpreted to mean that self-executing treaties automat-
ically become supreme law of the land without the need for any legisla-
181. Eric George Reeves, Note, United States v. Javino: Reconsidering the Relationship




184. Marley S. Weiss, International Treaties and Constitutional Systems of the United
States, Mexico, Canada: Foreward: Proceedings of the Seminar on International
Treaties and Constitutional Systems of the United States, Mexico and Canada: La-
boring in the Shadow of Regional Integration, 22 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 185, 197
(1998).
185. Id.
186. Reeves, supra note 181, at 881.
187. Weiss, supra note 184, at 208.
188. Reeves, supra note 181, at 881.
189. Id. at 882.
190. Mike Townsend, Note, Congressional Abrogation of Indian Treaties: Reevaluation
and Reform, 98 YALE L.J. 793, 796 (1989).
191. Weiss, supra note 184, at 206-07 (noting that the courts have developed a series of
factors for utilization in making such a determination, including language and pur-
pose of the treaty, circumstances of its execution, nature of the obligations im-
posed by the treaty, existence of domestic institutions and procedures appropriate
for direct implementation, including institutional capacity of the judiciary to re-
solve the dispute, availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement methods,
and the consequences of treating the treaty as self-executing or failing to do so).
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tive action.192 The implementing legislation of non self-executing treaties
is supreme law of the land. 193 As such, self-executing and non self-exe-
cuting treaties may both have domestic implication; however, Congress
may repeal the domestic consequences of a treaty in three ways: (1) by
terminating the treaty; (2) by repealing the legislation implementing a
non self-executing treaty; or (3) by enacting legislation triggering the last-
in-time rule for self-executing treaties.' 94 Because treaties and federal
statutes occupy equal position in the hierarchy of U.S. law, the later-in-
time rule is employed to resolve conflicts between federal statutes and
treaties.195 Courts apply constructive and interpretive rules disfavoring
the implication of congressional intent to overturn prior treaty-based law,
attempting as much as possible to give effect to both the treaty and the
later-in-time statute.196 However, if the conflict cannot be resolved, the
one enacted later in time will control. 19 7
B. EFFECr ON PRESIDENT'S ABILITY TO CARRY OUT TERMS OF
NAFTA ANNEX I
The Ninth Circuit's decision has no real impact on the president's abil-
ity to lift the moratorium. The president did not need the promulgation
of the DOT regulations to lift the moratorium. As stated above, the
Ninth Circuit decision impacts only the validity of the DOT regulations -
not the validity of NAFTA or the NAFTA Implementation Act. Al-
though President Bush may proceed with lifting the moratorium, at this
point the DOT will have to comply with the court's ruling before it can
begin to process applications of Mexican trucking firms. As such, it
would be futile for the president to lift the moratorium until the DOT
complies with the Ninth Circuit's ruling.
V. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the Ninth Circuit's decision's direct effect on the pres-
ident's ability to bring the United States into compliance with NAFTA
Annex I, the Sabo Amendment1 9" is later in time than the NAFTA Im-
plementation Act. Currently, speculation exists as to whether the United
States will comply with Annex I and begin to process Mexican trucks. 99
Although Bush has lifted the moratorium concerning U.S.-domiciled
192. Townsend, supra note 190, at 796.
193. Id. at 797.
194. Weiss, supra note 184, at 207.
195. Id. at 206.
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197. Id. at 208.
198. See supra notes 105 & 106.
199. See CRASH, GAO Report Says Mexican Truck Safety Still Lags (Jan. 10, 2002), at
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House Votes to Allow Mexican Trucks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/ aponline/national/AP-Mexican-Trucks.html.
BRAKES ON MEXICAN TRUCKERS
Mexican trucks, the moratorium is still in effect for Mexican-domiciled
Mexican trucks.
The DOT may file a motion for rehearing en banc in the Ninth Circuit
and/or may possibly file writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court to de-
termine under what circumstances an EIS is needed.
Even if President Bush lifted the moratorium, unless the Supreme
Court decides that the EIS and conformity determinations are not re-
quired, the DOT will still have to prepare them. This is because the DOT
will not be able to process Mexican trucking firms' applications for certifi-
cation to enter the United States due to the Ninth Circuit finding the
three enabling regulations invalid.
What measures can Mexico take if the United States fails to comply
with the NAFTA chapter 20 panel decision, and what would be the im-
pact on future trade agreements? NAFTA articles 2018 and 2019 provide
that the United States and Mexico should have agreed upon a resolution
consistent with the panel's determinations and recommendations within
thirty days of receiving the panel's final report - approximately March 8,
2001. Even if the president lifts the moratorium, if the DOT cannot pro-
cess applications, the United States will still fall short of compliance with
NAFTA. President Bush's assurances that the United States would com-
ply with NAFTA were taken by the Mexican government in good faith,
stalling the Mexican government's right under NAFTA to collect approxi-
mately $5 billion in sanctions.
Some scholars believe the United States is technically not bound by the
findings or recommendations of the NAFTA chapter 20 panel because
NAFTA is not a constitutionally ratified treaty.20 0 This contention is
based on the Constitution, article 2 section 2, which requires treaties to
be approved by two-thirds of the Senate. 201 The NAFTA Implementa-
tion Act was not passed by two-thirds of the Senate.20 2
If the United States does honor its obligations pursuant to NAFTA
Annex I, it will most likely occur during the George W. Bush administra-
tion. President Bush has been true to form in carrying out all of the
missed and/or failed objectives of his father's administration. In addition,
as the former governor of Texas - one of the commercial zone border
states - President Bush has always been in favor of cross-border truck-
ing. President Bush will likely complete his efforts to lift the moratorium
and honor the United States' obligations under NAFTA Annex I. Fur-
ther, the current Republican congressional occupation makes this the
best time to meet the objectives of NAFTA Annex I. The Supreme Court
will probably grant the DOT's writ of certiorari and rule that the Ninth
Circuit was without jurisdiction to decide the validity of a congressional
act, i.e., the three DOT regulations. As such, the DOT will be able to
process applications of Mexican trucking firms.
200. Weisweaver, supra note 1, at 484.
201. See supra note 185.
202. See supra note 23.
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Interestingly, the last-in-time implications of the Sabo Amendment
were not raised or considered by the Ninth Circuit. Notwithstanding the
Sabo Amendment, Congress may utilize last in time to circumvent the
United States' obligations under Annex 1, if it so desires. Based on the
courts' interpretation of such a conflict, however, it is likely that as much
legal effect as possible would be given to both NAFTA and any such
later-in-time congressional act.
Perspective Article

